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Objective: Considerable research indicates that individuals with dementia have deficits in the ability to
recognize emotion in other people. The present study examined ability to detect emotional qualities of
objects. Method: Fifty-two patients with frontotemporal dementia (FTD), 20 patients with Alzheimer’s
disease (AD), 18 patients awaiting surgery for intractable epilepsy, and 159 healthy controls completed
a newly developed test of ability to recognize emotional qualities of art (music and paintings), and
pleasantness in simple sensory stimuli (tactile, olfactory, auditory), and to make aesthetic judgments
(geometric shapes, room décor). A subset of participants also completed a test of ability to recognize
emotions in other people. Results: Patients with FTD showed a marked deficit in ability to recognize the
emotions conveyed in art, compared with both healthy individuals and patients with AD (relative to
controls, deficits in patients with AD only approached significance). This deficit remained robust after
controlling for FTD patients’ ability to recognize pleasantness in simple sensory stimuli, make aesthetic
judgments, identify odors, and identify emotions in other people. Neither FTD nor AD patients showed
deficits in recognizing pleasant sensory stimuli or making aesthetic judgments. Exploratory analysis of
patients with epilepsy revealed no deficits in any of these domains. Conclusion: Patients with FTD (but
not AD) showed a significant, specific deficit in ability to interpret emotional messages in art, echoing
FTD-related deficits in recognizing emotions in other people. This finding adds to our understanding of
the impact these diseases have on the lives of patients and their caregivers.
General Scientific Summary
The ability to recognize emotions in others, and to enjoy pleasing sensations and aesthetic environ-
ments, is an important part of human life. Using a newly developed test of the ability to recognize
emotional qualities in art, pleasantness in sensory stimuli, and to make aesthetic judgments, we found
deficits in these abilities in patients with two kinds of dementia (most profoundly in frontotemporal
dementia and less so in Alzheimer’s disease) but not in patients with epilepsy. With the aging
population and increasing number of families caring for loved ones with dementia, it is important to
understand how these diseases affect this important aspect of emotional functioning.
Keywords: emotion recognition, aesthetic judgments, frontotemporal dementia, Alzheimer’s disease,
epilepsy
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Recognizing and responding to the emotional properties of
environmental stimuli is important for successfully navigating the
external world and can play a valuable role in supporting well-
being. This broad category of functions includes several related but
distinguishable abilities. At the simplest level, people can enjoy
pleasant simple stimuli, such as the soft texture of a cashmere
blanket or the scent of a rose. People also respond to more complex
aesthetic features of the environment, such as the harmony of
colors in a room. At a more sophisticated level, people can rec-
ognize emotions expressed by others through facial expressions
and tone of voice, and can even detect emotional messages com-
municated through the formal features of art (e.g., perceiving a
piece of music as “happy” or “sad”). These abilities can provide
much enjoyment in life, and even contribute to resilience and
well-being during times of stress (e.g., Folkman, 1997; Shiota,
2006).
Much research has documented deficits among individuals with
frontotemporal dementia (FTD) in aspects of empathy toward
other people, including the ability to recognize their emotions
(e.g., Goodkind et al., 2015; Rosen et al., 2004). Less is known
about the implications of FTD and other neurological disorders for
responding to emotionally relevant properties of objects in the
environment such as art, aesthetic judgments, and simple sensory
stimuli. The current study aims to help address this gap.
Emotional Responses to Aesthetics and Art
Human responses to the emotional properties of objects in the
environment can take two broad forms: appreciating the object’s
sensory or aesthetic pleasantness (vs. unpleasantness); and decod-
ing its emotional message or tone (i.e., the emotion it communi-
cates). While people can evaluate even very simple stimuli in
terms of pleasantness, such as geometric shapes and scents, works
of art (including music and painting) are often intended by the
artist to convey a specific emotional quality, such as joy or
anguish. Abilities to evaluate stimulus pleasantness and to decode
emotional content in art overlap to some extent, but reflect distinct
adaptive functions, and may be supported by distinct psychological
and neural mechanisms.
The sensory stimuli we identify as pleasing are typically those
that helped sustain the lives of our ancestors, activating approach
behaviors that are critical for adaptive fitness (Shiota et al., 2017).
For example, the human sense of smell is closely linked to the
sense of taste (Shepherd, 2006), and the most strongly preferred
scents cross-culturally are those associated with palatable food
(Gang, 2005). Similarly, people prefer soft, fuzzy textures rather
than rough ones (Essick et al., 2010), reflecting an innate prefer-
ence for the feel of mammalian parents’ skin and fur (Harlow,
1958). In the domain of sound, people prefer individual tones and
consonant (vs. dissonant) combinations of tones that are charac-
teristic of human speech (Schwartz, Howe, & Purves, 2003). In the
visual domain, people tend to prefer figures that are symmetrical
(an indicator of health and developmental stability in living organ-
isms; Møller, 1997); moderately complex, with sharper angles
between sides and a combination of concave and convex angles
(Friedenberg & Bertamini, 2015); and perceptually balanced
around the geometric center of the image (Friedenberg & Ber-
tamini, 2015).
In contrast, the ability to perceive emotional messages in art
may be a byproduct of our ability to decode emotional expressions
in other people and use metaphors to describe emotional feelings.
For example, the acoustic properties of music that convey emotion
have been found to correspond to those of the human voice that
serve the same purpose (Juslin & Laukka, 2003). In the visual arts,
simple properties of color and line are perceived as expressing
affect in the same two-dimensional valence and arousal space
people use to describe their own feelings (Collier, 1996). Even in
verbal language, metaphors involving simple sensory experiences
are more effective at evoking emotions than literal statements with
the same meaning (Citron & Goldberg, 2014). The ability to
associate simple stimulus properties with emotional meaning
through metaphor, combined with the ability to perceive the emo-
tion expressed by a being other than the self, may combine to
produce the ability to decode the emotional meaning of art.
The available research on neural structures associated with these
functions suggests some overlap, and some differentiation. A rich
body of research identifies opioid receptor-rich regions of the
nucleus accumbens and ventral palladium as highly responsive to
sensory enjoyment or “liking” of simple stimuli such as pleasant
tastes (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2013). Studies of neural activity
during judgments of visual aesthetic preference, whether for sim-
ple geometric shapes or complex paintings, identify the orbitofron-
tal cortex (OFC) as an area that is more active while viewing
preferred stimuli (e.g., Jacobsen, Schubotz, Höfel, & Cramon,
2006; Kawabata & Zeki, 2004). This is consistent with the evi-
dence implicating OFC activation in stimulus valuation more
generally, such as in the context of economic games, assessments
of physical beauty, and aesthetic judgments (Chatterjee, 2011;
FitzGerald, Seymour, & Dolan, 2009; Stalnaker, Cooch, & Schoe-
nbaum, 2015). Multiple studies have also documented greater
activity in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) while viewing preferred
relative to nonpreferred paintings (Kawabata & Zeki, 2004; Varta-
nian & Goel, 2004).
Meta-analysis results suggest that processing of linguistic met-
aphor, relative to literal language, is associated with heightened
activation in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), the amygdala, and the
superior temporal gyrus (STG), among other regions (Bohrn, Alt-
mann, & Jacobs, 2012; Citron & Goldberg, 2014). The latter of
these are noteworthy as heightened amygdala and STG activation
are also commonly seen in emotion recognition tasks with human
face stimuli (Adolphs, 2002). Empirical reviews and meta-analysis
results further suggest that the amygdala, anterior insula, OFC, and
regions of the ACC and medial prefrontal cortex show heightened
activation during empathy tasks, although the exact profile of
activation depends on specific task demands (e.g., infer vs. feel the
target’s emotion; Adolphs, 2002; Fan, Duncan, de Greck, &
Northoff, 2011; Zaki & Ochsner, 2012).
Emotion Processing in Neurological Patients
Neurodegenerative diseases can affect brain circuitry that is
critical for emotion processing (Rosen & Levenson, 2009). A
number of studies have found that individuals with Alzheimer’s
disease (AD) and frontotemporal dementia (FTD) have deficits in
the ability to recognize emotion in other people (e.g., Fernandez-
Duque & Black, 2005; Goodkind et al., 2015; Hargrave, Maddock,
& Stone, 2002; Hsieh, Hodges, & Piguet, 2013; Keane, Calder,
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Hodges, & Young, 2002; Lavenu, Pasquier, Lebert, Petit, & Van
der Linden, 1999; Ostos, Schenk, Baenziger, & von Gunten, 2011;
Rosen et al., 2004; Rosen, Perry et al., 2002; Weiss et al., 2008;
Werner et al., 2007). When patients with AD and FTD have been
compared, these deficits appear to be more pronounced in FTD
(Goodkind et al., 2015; Lavenu et al., 1999). Among other neuro-
logical diseases, deficits in ability to recognize emotion in people
have also been reported in individuals with epilepsy (Meletti et al.,
2003; Reynders, Broks, Dickson, Lee, & Turpin, 2005) and
amygdala lesions (Adolphs et al., 1999). In addition, similar def-
icits have been found in individuals with a number of psychiatric
disorders (e.g., Ashwin, Chapman, Colle, & Baron-Cohen, 2006;
Chan, Li, Cheung, & Gong, 2010; Rocca, van den Heuvel,
Caetano, & Lafer, 2009).
One of the intriguing findings in this literature has been that
individuals with dementia have deficits in recognizing negative
emotions in other people, but that the ability to recognize positive
emotions may be preserved (Fernandez-Duque & Black, 2005;
Kessels et al., 2007; Lavenu et al., 1999; Lough et al., 2006).
Although evolutionary accounts of emotion often emphasize the
importance of negative emotions (which help us survive when
confronted with threats), the ability to detect positive emotions is
extremely important as well. Expressions of positive emotion
signal potential relationship partners who may be committed to our
welfare and able to provide important resources (e.g., Gonzaga,
Keltner, Londahl, & Smith, 2001). Given the needs of individuals
with dementia for care and assistance by others, preservation of the
ability to recognize positive emotion would be important to doc-
ument. However, as we have suggested elsewhere (Goodkind et
al., 2015), findings of preserved recognition of positive emotions
may result from a structural asymmetry in most tests of emotion
recognition. These tests typically utilize photographs of emotional
facial expressions that have multiple negative emotions but only a
single positive emotion (happiness portrayed by a smiling face),
thus making the detection of positive emotions much easier. Uti-
lizing a film-based emotion identification test that assessed mul-
tiple positive (e.g., affection, amusement), negative (e.g., anger,
fear), and self-conscious (e.g., embarrassment, pride) emotions, we
(Goodkind et al., 2015) found deficits in recognition for all three
kinds of emotion in patients with FTD.
A much smaller group of studies has examined dementia pa-
tients’ ability to identify the emotional qualities of nonface targets,
such as simple sensory stimuli and works of art (e.g., Boutoleau-
Bretonnière et al., 2016; Cohen et al., 2016; Dellacherie, Ehrlé, &
Samson, 2008; Omar et al., 2011). For example, Boutoleau-
Bretonniere and colleagues (2016) found that FTD patients gen-
erally rated abstract paintings as less pleasant and less emotionally
moving than did nonpatient controls. Cohen and colleagues (2016)
found that FTLD patients received lower scores than controls on a
match-to-sample task relying on the affective valence of abstract
art stimuli, with normative valence established through pilot re-
search. Although these studies consistently identify deficits in FTD
patients relative to controls, it is not clear from the tasks whether
the deficit lies in evaluating the pleasantness/enjoyability of stim-
uli (i.e., which is more pleasant?), in decoding the emotional
message of the stimuli (i.e., which communicates happiness?), or
both. The present study uses a novel test that helps tease these two
processes apart.
Comparing Emotion Recognition in Different
Neurological Disorders
As noted above, most studies of the ability of dementia patients
to recognize emotion in people have been conducted with FTD or
AD patients. FTD is a neurodegenerative disease that causes
atrophy in the frontal and temporal lobes (Zhang et al., 2009). In
the initial stages of the disease, FTD patients show profound
changes in emotion, personality, and behavior, including loss of
empathy, loss of social awareness, disinhibition, apathy, loss of in-
sight, and impaired emotion recognition (Rankin, Kramer, & Miller,
2005; Snowden et al., 2001). In contrast, AD causes atrophy in the
medial temporal and parietal lobes (Zhang et al., 2009). In the initial
stages, AD patients show marked deterioration of memory and cog-
nitive abilities, with relative preservation of emotional functioning
(e.g., Bucks & Radford, 2004; Goodkind, Gyurak, McCarthy, Miller,
& Levenson, 2010; Goodkind et al., 2015; Lavenu et al., 1999).
Although epilepsy is not considered to be a form of dementia, it is
often accompanied by emotional changes (e.g., depression and anxi-
ety; Hixson & Kirsch, 2009; Kanner, 2009). Moreover, seizure foci in
epilepsy can occur in regions (e.g., temporal lobes) that are vulnerable
in frontotemporal dementia (Zhang et al., 2009). Despite the obvious
virtue of comparing multiple neurological conditions, we are not
aware of previous studies of emotion recognition that included FTD,
AD, and epilepsy patients as well as healthy controls.
The Present Study
The present study assessed the ability of neurological patients with
FTD and AD to recognize emotion in art (paintings and music) and
pleasantness in simple sensory stimuli (olfactory, auditory, tactile),
and to make aesthetic judgments (geometric shapes, room décor), in
comparison to a group of healthy controls, and, in an exploratory
analysis, a group of epilepsy patients awaiting surgery for intractable
seizures. In a subgroup of the patients with FTD and AD, the ability
to recognize emotion in facial expressions was also assessed.
Method
Participants
Participants were 52 patients with FTD (25 males, 27 females),
20 patients with AD (11 males, 9 females), and 159 controls (82
males, 76 females, 1 who declined to indicate gender). Among the
FTD patients, 25 were diagnosed with behavioral variant FTD, 21
with semantic dementia, and six with primary nonfluent aphasia.
Patients with FTD and AD were recruited through the Memory and
Aging Center of the University of California, San Francisco
(UCSF), where they received comprehensive neurological and
neuropsychological testing. Because significant numbers of par-
ticipants were assessed prior to the appearance of newer diagnostic
criteria (e.g., Gorno-Tempini et al., 2011; Rascovsky et al., 2007,
2011), the Neary clinical criteria (Neary et al., 1998) were used to
diagnose FTD. Similarly, the National Institute of Neurological
and Communication Diseases criteria and those of the Stroke/
Alzheimer’s disease and Related Disorders Association (McKhann
et al., 1984) were used to diagnose AD. Controls were adult
caregivers (mostly spouses) of patients with FTD and AD who
were participating in a study of emotional functioning in dementia
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1165EMOTION RECOGNITION IN NEUROLOGICAL PATIENTS
caregivers conducted at the Berkeley Psychophysiology Labora-
tory at the University of California, Berkeley.
An additional group of 18 patients with intractable epilepsy (6
males, 12 females) was recruited by one of the authors (HEK) at
the UCSF Medical Center. These patients were all awaiting sur-
gery to alleviate medically refractory seizures. Including patients
with intractable focal epilepsy provides affords an important test of
the specificity of findings by establishing whether deficits found in
patients with dementia generalize to another neurological condi-
tion.
We included patients with AD, different FTD subtypes, and
epilepsy to increase the anatomical and behavioral variability in
our sample. AD is characterized by neurodegeneration in hip-
pocampus, entorhinal cortex, and posterior cingulate and may
leave emotional functioning relatively intact in the early stages of
disease (Goodkind et al., 2010; Lavenu & Pasquier, 2005). Com-
pared to AD, FTD is characterized by degeneration in more ante-
rior brain regions and produces more profound deficits in emo-
tional functioning (Levenson & Miller, 2007). Among the three
subtypes of FTD included in our sample: (a) behavioral variant
FTD is characterized by bilateral frontal lobe degeneration and
significant changes in emotion and personality; (b) semantic de-
mentia is characterized by atrophy in anterior temporal areas and
language problems; and (c) primary nonfluent aphasia is charac-
terized by predominantly left-sided frontotemporal atrophy and
problems with speaking (Neary et al., 1998; Rosen, Gorno-
Tempini, et al., 2002; Rosen, Kramer, et al., 2002). Patients with
epilepsy who receive surgical treatment for intractable seizures
often have seizure foci in the temporal region and may experience
significant emotional changes (Meletti et al., 2003; Reynders et al.,
2005). Network dysfunction in these patients with epilepsy is
thought to involve frontotemporal regions, anatomic substrates that
are similar to those affected in FTD. In our sample of 18 epilepsy
patients, 15 had established temporal foci with nine having a
primary left hemisphere focus and nine having a primary right
hemisphere focus.
Patients with dementia and epilepsy and controls in this sample
participate in various research projects conducted at UCSF and at
UC Berkeley. AD and FTD patients and controls in this sample all
participated in a comprehensive assessment of emotional function-
ing (Levenson, 2007) conducted at UC Berkeley. Some data from
these assessments have been published previously (e.g., Goodkind
et al., 2015). However, no data from these participants related to
detecting the emotional qualities of objects have been published
previously.
Measures
Emotion in objects. We utilized the Test of Emotional Aes-
thetics (TEA), a 16-item test developed at the Berkeley Psycho-
physiology Laboratory, to assess ability to recognize the emotional
qualities of art (paintings, music), simple sensory stimuli (olfac-
tory, auditory, tactile), and to make aesthetic judgments (room
décor, geometric shapes). The instructions and visual and auditory
stimuli for the TEA are presented on a laptop computer.
Stimuli for the art items included two pairs of paintings and two
pairs of short musical excerpts; stimuli within each pair were
always by the same artist. In the paintings (Picasso: “Weeping
Woman” and “The Dream”; Van Gogh: “Wheat Field with Cy-
presses” and “Wheat Fields with Crows”), each painting in the pair
depicts a similar subject through very different formal features,
thereby conveying distinct emotional messages. Specifically,
whereas “The Dream” and “Wheat Field with Cypresses” use
lighter, primary, saturated colors and smoother, curved lines to
convey calm positive affect, “Weeping Woman” and “Wheat
Fields with Crows” both use darker, nonprimary, less saturated
colors and sharper, more jagged lines to convey negative affect
(Collier, 1996). Similarly, pairs of musical excerpts (Living Out
Loud soundtrack, “Ecstasy” and “She’s 34”; Bach Goldberg Vari-
ations: #21 and #22) present the same musical theme, one with a
quick tempo and major key to convey happiness, and the other
with slower tempo and minor key to convey sadness (Gabrielsson
& Juslin, 2003). In each art item, the participant was asked to
identify which of the pair was “more happy,” relying on the ability
to decode the emotional messages of the two options.
Eleven items assessed preferences for simple sensory or aes-
thetic stimuli: (a) Olfactory 1—scratch and sniff: apple versus
natural gas; (b) Olfactory 2—scratch and sniff: mint versus paint
thinner; (c) Auditory 1 and 2—consonant versus dissonant piano
chords; (d) Tactile 1 —reach into bags: Brillo pad versus silk; (e)
Tactile 2—reach into bags: cotton versus sandpaper; (f) Aesthetic
visual judgments 1 and 2—two rooms decorated with different color
schemes; and (j) Aesthetic visual judgments 3, 4, and 5—pairs of
geometric and abstract shapes, differing on complexity and balance
(one of these was taken from the Visual Aesthetic Sensitivity Test;
Götz, Borisy, Lynn, & Eysenck, 1979). In each pair of items, the
correct response was based on the empirically supported principles of
aesthetic preference discussed in the introduction section of this paper.
Figure 1 presents example stimulus pairs from the aesthetic visual
items. In each preference item, participants are asked which of the two
options is “more pleasing.” The 16th item assesses Odor Identifica-
tion, presenting a single scratch and sniff rose smell with three label
choices: smoke, rose, or lemon.
Each of the 16 items was scored correct (1) or incorrect (0), and
normative responses were validated with an independent group of
healthy controls. Percentage correct scores were computed for the
following subscales: (a) Art (four items); Sensory stimuli (six
items); Aesthetic visual judgments (five items); and Odor identi-
fication (one item). Copies of the TEA (along with instructions for
creating the tactile and odor items) are available from the authors.
Emotion in people. The Empathy Film Test (EFT; Goodkind
et al., 2015) assesses ability to recognize emotions in other people.
It consists of 11 excerpts (approximately 40 s in length) from
commercial films each featuring a character expressing one of four
positive (affection, amusement, calm, enthusiasm), four negative
(anger, disgust, fear, sadness), or three self-conscious (embarrass-
ment, shame, pride) emotions. After each clip, the participant is
shown a photo of the main character with a neutral facial expres-
sion and a list of the 11 target emotions and asked: “What emotion
did the character feel most strongly?” Reliabilities of the EFT
subscales (Cronbach’s alpha: positive emotions  .63; negative
emotions  .72, self-conscious emotions  .65) have been pub-
lished previously (Goodkind et al., 2015).
The EFT has several advantages over traditional tests of emo-
tion recognition (e.g., Bowers, Blonder, & Heilman, 1991) in
which respondents have to provide the correct emotion label (e.g.,
“happy”) for a static photograph of an isolated emotional facial
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expression (e.g., a single smiling person). The EFT has arguably
greater ecological validity by virtue of assessing respondents’
ability to recognize emotion using dynamic, multimodal (visual,
auditory), and interpersonal stimuli. These conditions more closely
mirror real-world emotional judgments compared to photographs,
which are static, convey only visual information, and are usually
not depicted in interpersonal situations (Goodkind et al., 2015).
Moreover, photograph-based tests typically assess multiple nega-
tive emotions (e.g., anger, fear, sadness, disgust) but only assess a
single positive emotion (happiness as portrayed by a smiling face)
and do not assess self-conscious emotions. In contrast, the EFT
assesses multiple positive and multiple self-conscious emotions in
addition to multiple negative emotions. Thus, in addition to its
ecological validity, the EFT can provide a more comprehensive
test of the ability to recognize emotion in people.
Each response on the EFT was scored correct (1) or incorrect (0)
and a percent correct score was determined for the following
subscales: (a) Positive emotion (four items), (b) Negative emotion
(four items), and (c) Self-conscious emotion (three items). Because
the assessment of ability to recognize emotion in the present study
focused primarily on positive emotion (i.e., happiness in art, pleas-
antness in sensory stimuli and aesthetic judgments), we used the
Positive emotion score from the EFT in our primary analyses to
control for deficits in emotion recognition in people when assess-
ing deficits in emotion recognition in objects using the TEA. In
secondary analyses, we also used the Negative and Self-conscious
emotion scores from the EFT.
Procedure
Patients with FTD and AD participated in a comprehensive
assessment of emotional functioning (Levenson, 2007) at the
Berkeley Psychophysiology Laboratory. As part of this assess-
ment, they completed the TEA and the EFT. Caregivers who
accompanied the patients also completed the TEA and the EFT.
Epilepsy patients completed the TEA at the UCSF Medical Center
but did not complete the EFT. All participants gave informed
consent prior to participation. The study was approved by the
Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects at the University
of California, Berkeley and the University of California, San
Francisco.
Data Analysis
Analyses initially focused on the FTD and AD patients and
controls because these groups had completed both the TEA and the
EFT. An overall 3  4 (Diagnosis [FTD, AD, controls]  TEA
subscale [Art, Sensory stimuli, Aesthetic judgments, Odor identi-
fication) repeated measures MANOVA was computed using the
General Linear Model procedure in SPSS Version 24. In this
MANOVA, TEA subscale was treated as a repeated measure and
all main effects and interactions were analyzed using multivariate
F tests (which obviate the need to control for violations of sphe-
ricity in the repeated measures). Significant effects were followed
up by comparisons among means using least-significance differ-
ence tests and 95% confidence intervals (CI).
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Psychometrics. Because the TEA has not been used in prior
published research, we conducted basic psychometric analyses
using our sample of 159 healthy controls. These revealed that the
internal consistency of the 16-item test was moderate (Cronbach’s
alpha  .45). We expect this reflects both restriction in range in
our neurologically healthy sample and the TEA’s assessment of
different kinds of emotional judgments. Consistent with range
restriction, for controls the percent correct score averaged across
all 16 items was 84% (SE  .89, range  44–100%) with the
lowest percent correct generally found for the aesthetic judgments
of geometric shapes. An item-level reliability analysis revealed
that the overall reliability of the scale was not markedly changed
by removing any of the individual items.
Sample characteristics. The average age for the sample of
patients with FTD and AD and healthy controls was 62.4 years
(SE  0.6). This sample was well-educated (mean years of edu-
cation  16.5, SE  0.2) and primarily Caucasian (88.0%). Anal-
yses revealed no gender, 2(2)  0.35, p  .84, age, F(2, 226) 
.02, p  .99, or education, F(2, 224)  1.43, p  .24 differences
among the three groups. The sample of epilepsy patients used in
the exploratory analysis was younger (mean age 35.5, SE 2.9)
and less educated (mean years of education  13.7, SE  0.4).
Using data obtained from neuropsychological testing of patients
with FTD and AD conducted at UCSF, Mini-Mental State (Fol-
stein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) scores (which can range from
0–30, with lower scores indicating greater cognitive impairment)
Figure 1. Sample visual aesthetics item stimulus pairs from test of
emotional aesthetics. A. Rooms; B. Geometric shapes. In each item, the
participant is asked to identify which of the pair is “more pleasing.” Correct
answers are (A) left; (B) right. See the online article for the color version
of this figure.
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indicated moderate cognitive impairment (M  23.1, SE  0.7),
and clinical dementia rating (Morris, 1993) sum of boxes scores
(which can range from 0 to 18, with higher scores indicating
greater dementia severity) indicated moderate levels of dementia
severity (mean sum of boxes  5.0, SE  0.4). Table 1 presents
demographic and clinical data for the diagnostic groups.
Emotion in Objects
FTD, AD, and controls. The MANOVA of the TEA revealed
significant main effects for Diagnosis, F(2, 228) 21.96, p .001
and TEA Subscale, F(3, 226)  16.88, p  .001 as well as a
significant interaction of Diagnosis  TEA Subscale, F(6, 454) 
7.80, p  .001. Examining the main effect for Diagnosis, both
FTD patients and AD patients scored lower than controls (FTD vs.
controls: 95% CI  17.15, 8.86, p  .001; AD vs. controls:
95% CI  16.73, 4.41, p  .0011). Differences between FTD
and AD patients were not significant (p  .483). Examining the
main effect for TEA Subscale, performance on the Art subscale
and Sensory stimuli subscale were higher than the Aesthetic judg-
ments subscale (Art vs. Aesthetic judgments: 95% CI  8.38,
17.78, p  .001; Sensory stimuli vs. Aesthetic judgments: 95%
CI  6.40, 15.27, p  .001) and Odor identification subscale (Art
vs. Odor identification: 95% CI 10.63, 24.99, p .001; Sensory
stimuli vs. Odor identification: 95% CI  8.66, 22.47, p  .001).
The Diagnosis  Tea Subscale interaction was decomposed by
computing univariate Diagnosis ANOVAs for each TEA subscale.
These revealed that the main effect for Diagnosis was not signif-
icant for Sensory stimuli, F(2, 228)  0.57, p  .57 or for
Aesthetic judgments, F(2, 230)  0.20, p  .82. However, the
main effect for Diagnosis was significant for Art, F(2, 228) 
23.08, p  .001 and Odor identification, F(2, 228)  19.01, p 
.001. For Art, FTD patients scored lower than AD patients (95%
CI  18.86, 2.30, p  .013) and lower than controls (95%
CI  22.29, 12.23, p  .001). AD patients also scored lower
than controls, but this difference only approached significance
(95% CI  14.15, .79, p  .079). For Odor identification, both
dementia patient groups scored lower than controls (FTD vs.
controls: 95% CI  42.57, 19.33, p  .001; AD vs. controls:
95% CI  52.82, 18.31, p  .001), but did not differ from
each other (FTD vs. AD: 95% CI  14.52, 23.75, p  .635).
Table 2 presents TEA data for the diagnostic groups.
Comparing FTD subtypes. The sample sizes for FTD pa-
tients with behavioral variant FTD (N  25) and semantic demen-
tia (N  21) were not large. Nonetheless, we thought it useful to
conduct analyses to assess performance of these two FTD subtypes
on the TEA and its subscales. Using univariate ANOVAs, the two
FTD subtypes did not differ on overall TEA scores or on any of the
subscales (Overall: F(1, 44)  .25, p  .62; Art: F(1, 44)  .57,
p  .46; Sensory stimuli: F(1, 44)  .40, p  .53; Aesthetic
judgments: F(1, 44)  .12, p  .73; Odor identification: F(1,
44)  .01, p  .94). Moreover, there was no consistent pattern of
one subtype performing better across the subscales. The smallish
sample sizes require caution in interpreting this null finding, but
the pattern of results does not suggest that deficits on the TEA in
the larger FTD sample were driven by deficits in a particular
subgroup. Table 3 presents TEA scores for the two FTD subtypes.
Summary. Both FTD and AD patients showed lower perfor-
mance overall on the TEA compared to controls. In terms of
specific deficits, both FTD and AD patients showed deficits in
Odor identification but no deficits in detecting pleasantness in
Sensory stimuli or Aesthetic judgments. On the Art subscale, FTD
patients showed significant deficits, and AD patients showed mar-
ginal deficits, compared to healthy controls. An exploratory anal-
ysis comparing TEA performance in two FTD subtypes found no
evidence of differences between patients with behavioral variant
FTD and semantic dementia.
Robustness of FTD Deficits in Recognizing Emotion
in Art
Because not all of the participants who completed the TEA
completed the EFT, this analysis was conducted using data from a
smaller pool of participants (34 FTD, 11 AD, 62 controls) who
completed both tests. In this smaller sample, an ANOVA of
performance on the Positive emotion subscale of the EFT revealed
a significant main effect for Diagnosis, F(2, 104)  16.61, p 
.001 with both FTD patients and AD patients scoring lower than
healthy controls (FTD vs. controls: 95% CI  34.15, 15.03,
p .001; AD vs. controls: 95% CI42.70,13.38, p .001).
Table 2 presents EFT data for the diagnostic groups.
To evaluate the specificity of the deficits in recognizing emotion
in art found for FTD patients, we determined whether this deficit
was accounted for by deficits in ability to recognize emotion in
other kinds of objects and in people. We conducted an analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA) examining diagnostic group differences in
performance on the Art subscale of the TEA, while controlling for
the three other TEA subscales (Sensory stimuli, Aesthetic judg-
ments, Odor identification) and for the Positive emotion subscale
of the EFT. This ANCOVA revealed a main effect for diagnostic
group that approached significance, F(2, 106)  2.97, p  .056.
Follow-up comparisons revealed that FTD patients (estimated
mean %  81.85) still scored significantly lower than controls
(estimated mean % 91.51; 95% CI17.98,1.34, p .023),
even when controlling for the four covariates.
In exploratory analyses, we determined whether FTD patients’
deficit in recognizing emotion in art would remain when control-
ling for their ability to recognize emotion in other objects and their
ability to recognize either negative emotions or self-conscious
emotions in people. We computed two ANCOVAs that controlled
for the three other TEA subscales (Sensory stimuli, Aesthetic
judgments, and Odor identification) as well as performance on
either the Negative emotion subscale or the Self-conscious emo-
tion subscale of the EFT. In both analyses, controlling for all four
covariates, FTD patients still scored significantly lower than con-
trols (Negative emotion on EFT: 95% CI  19.73, 2.435, p 
.013; Self-conscious emotion on EFT: 95% CI17.279,.520,
p  .038).
Are Deficits in Recognizing Emotion in Objects Also
Found in Patients With Epilepsy?
To determine whether our TEA findings with FTD and AD
patients generalized to another patient group, we recomputed our
1 When the Odor identification item was removed from this analysis, the
pairwise contrast between AD patients and controls was no longer signif-
icant (CI  7.67, 3.19, p  .42). All other results are unchanged.
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overall MANOVA adding data from the 18 patients with epilepsy.
In this expanded ANOVA there were significant effects for Diag-
nosis, F(3, 245)  15.97, p  .001, TEA Subscale, F(3, 243) 
16.39, p  .001, and Diagnosis  TEA Subscale, F(9, 735) 
5.35, p  .001. Decomposing the Diagnosis  TEA interaction
with univariate Diagnosis ANOVAs for each TEA subscale re-
vealed that the epilepsy patients (see Table 2) did not differ from
the controls in the Art (95% CI  8.90, 6.65, p  .78), Sensory
stimuli (95% CI  4.47, 11.18, p  .40), Aesthetic judgments
(95% CI  9.99, 11.00, p  .93), or Odor identification sub-
scales (95% CI  13.82, 21.58, p  .67). FTD patients scored
lower than epilepsy patients on the Art subscale (95%
CI  24.68, 7.59, p  .001) and both FTD patients and AD
patients scored lower than epilepsy patients on the Odor identification
subscale (FTD vs. epilepsy: 95% CI  54.30, 15.36, p  .001;
AD vs. epilepsy: 95% CI  62.57, 16.32, p  .001).
Discussion
Summary of Findings
This study sought to determine whether patients with two kinds
of dementia, FTD and AD, had deficits in recognizing emotional
properties of objects as compared to healthy age-matched controls
and, in an exploratory analysis, patients with epilepsy. Using the
TEA, a newly developed test of ability to recognize emotional and
aesthetic qualities in art and sensory stimuli, we found that patients
with FTD showed significant and specific deficits in recognizing
the emotions communicated by art (i.e., music and paintings); AD
patients’ deficits on this subtest of the TEA only approached
significance. Of note, FTD patients’ deficit in ability to decode
emotional messages in art was quite robust, found even after
controlling for the three other subscales of the TEA (Sensory
stimuli, Aesthetic judgments, Odor identification) and the ability
to recognize either positive emotion, negative emotion, or self-
conscious emotion in other people (measured by the EFT). Both
patient groups showed deficits in the ability to recognize positive
emotion in other people (on the EFT), as well as deficits in
identifying a specific odor. In contrast, neither FTD nor AD patients
showed deficits in evaluating the pleasantness of simple sensory
stimuli in normative ways, or in making aesthetic judgments for visual
images.
We considered the possibility that the specific pattern of deficits
shown by FTD patients in the TEA reflected item difficulty, with
patients performing worst on the items that were the most difficult
(i.e., aesthetic judgments of geometric shapes had the lowest percent
Table 1
Demographic and Clinical Information for Diagnostic Groups
Variable FTD AD Epilepsy Controls Total
N 52 20 18 159 249
Sex: % female 51.9 45.0 66.7 47.8 50.0
Age: Mean (SE) 62.6 (1.0) 62.2 (2.0) 35.5 (2.9) 62.4 (.8) 60.5 (.7)
Education: Years (SE) 16.0 (.4) 17.0 (.8) 13.7 (.4) 16.5 (.2) 16.3 (.2)
Race/Ethnicity: %
Caucasian 86.2 88.9 n/a 88.5 88.0
Asian/Asian American 9.8 5.6 n/a 3.2 4.9
Hispanic 3.9 0 n/a 1.9 2.2
African American 0 0 n/a 1.3 .9
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 0 0 n/a 1.3 .9
American Indian/Native Alaskan 0 0 n/a .6 .4
Refused to state/Unknown 0 5.6 n/a 0 .4
Clinical information: Mean (SE)
Mini-Mental State Examination 24.1 (.8) 20.9 (1.0) n/a n/a 23.1 (.7)
Clinical dementia rating sum of boxes 4.9 (.5) 5.3 (.5) n/a n/a 5.0 (.4)
Note. FTD  frontotemporal dementia; AD  Alzheimer’s disease; n/a  not available; SE  standard error.
Table 2
Test of Emotional Aesthetics (TEA) and Empathy Film Task (EFT) Scores for Diagnostic Groups
Task FTD AD Epilepsy Controls Total
TEA: Mean (SE)
Overall 76.4 (1.8) 80.0 (1.8) 85.4 (2.8) 84.0 (.9) 82.2 (.8)
Art 76.9 (3.2) 87.5 (3.4) 93.1 (3.4) 94.2 (1.0) 90.0 (1.1)
Sensory stimuli 83.0 (2.7) 83.3 (3.0) 88.9 (3.6) 85.5 (1.2) 85.1 (1.0)
Aesthetic judgments 71.5 (2.8) 75.0 (4.1) 73.3 (5.1) 72.8 (1.8) 72.8 (1.4)
Odor identification 59.6 (6.9) 55.0 (11.4) 94.4 (5.6) 90.6 (2.3) 81.5 (2.5)
EFT: Mean (SE)
Positive emotions 69.4 (5.3) 65.9 (9.7) n/a 94.0 (1.7) 83.3 (2.5)
Negative emotions 76.2 (4.5) 93.2 (3.5) n/a 97.2 (1.1) 90.2 (1.8)
Self-conscious emotions 44.1 (5.8) 59.1 (9.9) n/a 80.2 (2.7) 66.7 (3.0)
Note. Values are mean percent correct on the indicated scale or subscale. FTD  frontotemporal dementia;
AD  Alzheimer’s disease; n/a  not available; SE  standard error.
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1169EMOTION RECOGNITION IN NEUROLOGICAL PATIENTS
correct in the control sample). However, this was not the case;
neither FTD nor AD patients differed significantly from controls
on these items. We also considered whether the FTD patients’
deficits on the TEA might be driven by particular FTD subtypes
(e.g., language problems in patients with semantic dementia).
However, in an exploratory analysis we found no evidence for
differential performance on the TEA between patients with behav-
ioral variant FTD and patients with semantic dementia. Finally, to
examine the possibility that deficits on the TEA found in patients
with FTD and AD would also be found in other neurological
disorders, we examined a group of epilepsy patients awaiting
surgery to treat intractable seizures. Patients with epilepsy did not
show deficits on any of the TEA subscales (they did not take the
EFT). Thus, the deficits we found in FTD and AD patients did not
generalize to another neurological disease that has also been found
to affect emotional functioning (Hixson & Kirsch, 2009).
Emotion Recognition in Neurodegenerative Disease
The present findings support and extend the existing literature
on emotion recognition in neurological patients. Extensive prior
evidence indicates deficits among dementia patients in the ability
to recognize nonverbal expressions of emotion in other people—a
crucial skill for successfully navigating the social world (e.g.,
Goodkind et al., 2015; Lavenu et al., 1999). Emotion recognition
is subserved by complex neural circuitry (Adolphs, 2002; Preston
& De Waal, 2002) and has proved to be vulnerable to a number of
neurological disorders including AD and FTD (e.g., Cadieux &
Greve, 1997; Goodkind et al., 2015; Gray & Tickle-Degnen, 2010;
Johnson et al., 2007; Keane et al., 2002) as well as a number of
psychiatric disorders (e.g., Ashwin et al., 2006; Chan et al., 2010;
Rocca, et al., 2009). Neurodegenerative diseases like FTD and AD
produce different patterns of deficits depending on the extent and
location of neurodegeneration in large-scale brain networks (See-
ley, Crawford, Zhou, Miller, & Greicius, 2009). For this reason, it
is important to assess multiple aspects of emotion recognition (e.g.,
in objects and in people) in ways that are sensitive to patterns of
lost and preserved functioning in different disorders and in differ-
ent individuals.
Our findings reveal that patients with FTD and AD both show
deficits in an understudied aspect of emotion recognition—the
ability to decode emotional tone in works of art—but that these
deficits are more profound and pervasive in FTD. These findings
are consistent with prior studies that examined recognition of
affective valence in art and abstract objects in FTD patients
(Boutoleau-Bretonnière et al., 2016; Cohen et al., 2016; Dellach-
erie et al., 2008; Omar et al., 2011), and extend them by localizing
the deficit to reading emotional tone in art, rather than appreciating
the inherent pleasantness of stimuli such as scents and visual
images. These deficits are particularly interesting given prior ev-
idence that some neurological patients develop new artistic inter-
ests and skills during the course of the disease (Seeley et al., 2008).
The ability to recognize emotional tone in art is analogous to the
ability to read and respond to emotions in other people, and our
findings suggest that patients with FTD show distinct deficits in
both. As with empathy for other humans, describing one painting
or piece of music as “happier” than another requires the ability to
attribute a psychological state to something other than the self (i.e.,
mentalizing or theory of mind). With art, this judgment may be
based on a visual or auditory metaphor and may involve having a
visceral reaction to the target stimulus, using that reaction to
estimate the target’s emotional “state.” These processes are often
compromised in FTD. Prior research documents robust deficits in
theory of mind, as well as deficits in comprehension of metaphor-
laden, sarcastic, and nonliteral speech, in behavioral variant FTD
in particular (e.g., Bora, Walterfang, & Velakoulis, 2015). More-
over, damage to structures such as the anterior insula that are
critical for processing visceral feedback commonly accompanying
emotion (Craig, 2009) can reduce the potency of experiential
aspects of emotional responding (Verstaen et al., 2016). We and
others have shown that FTD patients have problems generating
robust emotional responses (Eckart, Sturm, Miller, & Levenson,
2012; Sturm, Rosen, Allison, Miller, & Levenson, 2006; Sturm,
Ascher, Miller, & Levenson, 2008); a deficit that may carry over
into responding to emotional messages in works of art.
In contrast, we expect that judgments about stimulus pleasant-
ness reflect a mix of hard-wired and deeply learned associations
residing in brain areas that are not early targets of FTD and AD
(e.g., opioid receptor-rich regions of the nucleus accumbens and
ventral palladium; Berridge & Kringelbach, 2013). Although as-
sessed only with a single item, our finding that FTD and AD patients
had deficits in odor identification is consistent with previous findings
of anosmia and other olfactory deficits in these and other neurode-
generative diseases (Luzzi et al., 2007; McLaughlin & Westervelt,
2008; Mesholam, Moberg, Mahr, & Doty, 1998). Epilepsy has been
associated with impairments in aspects of emotional functioning (Hix-
son & Kirsch, 2009; Kanner, 2009), but in our study these did not
extend to problems recognizing emotion in objects. Although epilepsy
and FTD may have some overlap in regions of neuroanatomical
impairment, epilepsy is more chronic than degenerative; thus, pre-
served neural plasticity in individuals with epilepsy may allow other
regions to carry out these emotional functions.
Strengths and Limitations
The present study had several strengths, including (a) assessing
emotion recognition in a number of different kinds of objects, (b)
assessing multiple patient groups, and (c) exploring the robustness
of found deficits (by controlling for deficits in other aspects of
emotion recognition in objects and people). Limitations included
(a) small sample size (especially for patients with AD who com-
pleted both the TEA and the EFT, for patients with epilepsy, and
for FTD subtypes), (b) lack of power for examining ethnic differ-
ences (the sample was predominately Caucasian), (c) focusing on
positive emotional judgments (i.e., happiness and pleasantness)
Table 3
Test of Emotional Aesthetics (TEA) for FTD Subtypes
Tea component Behavioral variant FTD Semantic dementia
N 25 21
TEA: Mean (SE)
Overall 77.0 (2.8) 75.0 (2.9)
Art 79.0 (4.0) 73.8 (5.8)
Sensory stimuli 84.0 (4.0) 80.2 (4.5)
Aesthetic judgments 71.2 (4.2) 73.3 (4.4)
Odor identification 56.0 (10.1) 57.1 (11.1)
Note. FTD  frontotemporal dementia; SE  standard error.
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and not including negative emotional judgments (e.g., unhappiness
and unpleasantness); and (d) differences in type of emotional
judgments made for music and paintings (i.e., happiness) versus
sensory stimuli and aesthetic judgments (i.e., pleasantness).
Concerning emotional judgments, we would expect similar find-
ings if participants were asked to recognize negative emotional
qualities rather than the positive emotional qualities we assessed.
However, this clearly needs to be tested empirically. Similarly,
additional research is needed to confirm that the patterns of deficits
observed in this study are found specifically when assessing ability
to detect the emotion conveyed by art (e.g., happiness in music)
rather than its pleasantness. This may be particularly interesting in
cases where an artistic stimulus conveys a negative emotion, yet is
still pleasant (e.g., some very sad music is quite lovely), or vice
versa.
Conclusion
The ability to recognize emotion in people and objects plays a
vital role in our lives. The current study revealed that patients with
FTD, and to a lesser extent those with AD, had impairments in
recognizing emotions expressed in paintings and music, as com-
pared to patients with epilepsy and controls. Deficits in the ability
to recognize emotion in art may at first seem to be a fairly rarified
loss. However, it is important to realize the important role that
music and the visual arts play in the arsenal of emotion regulation.
We often use music to alter our emotional state in desired ways,
raising our spirits and deepening the experience of life’s losses. Art
is often used strategically in our home and work environments to
foster particular moods. Losing access to this aspect of emotion
recognition can contribute to the impoverishment of emotion that
is so often seen in patients with FTD, and can add to the burden
and strain experienced by their caregivers (e.g., Brown et al.,
2018). These findings shed additional light on the ways that
aspects of emotion recognition are preserved and diminished in
different neurological diseases and add greater understanding to
the profound impact that FTD can have on a wide range of
emotional functions.
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